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Many economists have criticized adherents
offlexible exchange rates for overestimating
the effectiveness ofexchange-rate changes on
redressing external imbalances. The critics
argue that, since the advent of generalized
floating in May 1973, large and persistent
trade-account imbalances have occurred
despite substantial swings in exchange rates.
The issue, however, is not a new one among
international economists.
According to traditional theory, an
exchange-rate depreciation will improve the
trade account of a devaluing country by
increasing its price competitiveness in world
markets. For example, a dollar depreciation
can correct a trade deficit because it lowers the
price of U.S. exports in terms of foreign cur-
rencies and raises the dollar price ofimports in
the U.S. market. Because U.S. goods become
relatively cheaper to foreigners and imported
goods more expensive to Americans, a dollar
depreciation will improve the price com-
petitiveness of U.S. export industries and
likewise import-competing industries. The
improved price competitiveness will boost
U.S. export sales while reducing foreign sales
in the U.S., leading to an improvement in the
trade account.
In the past, many economists and policy
makers doubted that these exchange-rate
effects would be great enough to eliminate
payment shortfalls. In their view, the volume
effects of a dollar depreciation might not be
large enough to produce an improvement in
theU.S. trade balance. Foranalyzing this ques-
tion, economists estimate price elasticities,
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which measure the degree ofresponsiveness of
the quantity demanded to changes in its price.
Numerically, a price elasticity of demand for
exports (imports) of-2.0 indicates that a I-per-
cent rise in export (import) prices will lead to a
2-percent drop in the quantity demanded of
exports (imports). A devaluation will improve
the trade account in both domestic and foreign
currency if the sum of the demand elasticities
for exports and imports after reversing signs
exceeds unity (the Marshall-Lerner condi-
tion). This assumes that an exchange-rate de-
preciation will lead to a proportional decline in
the foreign-currency price of exports and a
proportional rise in the home price of imports
- and that the trade account will initially be in
balance.
Many studies during the 1940s argued that
the measured price elasticities were substan-
tially less than one, so that a devaluing country
would experience a worsening of its trade
account. Such elasticity pessimism conse-
quently led policymakers to consider policies
other than relative-price changes to correct
trade imbalances. However, the state ofthe art
for empirical research improved considerably
in the 1950s and 1960s. This, in turn, led to
higher estimated price elasticities of demand,
and contributed to renewed optimism about
the success of a devaluation. In this view, the
volume effects (higher exports, lower
imports) would offset the adverse movement
in the terms oftrade and thus would lead to an
improvement in the trade account.
The focus of the debate has subsequently
shifted. While many critics do not dispute that
a currency depreciation will eventually
improve the trade account, they argue that the
long time lags between changes in prices andchanges in quantities diminish its usefulness as
an instrument of adjustment. That is, it takes
time for buyers and sellers to recognize
changes in competitive situations and act
accordingly. In the case ofa dollar devaluation,
Americans in the meantime will be spending
more dollars on imported goods and foreigners
will be spending less oftheir own currency on
U.S. goods. An exchange-rate change thus is
likely to lead to an initial deterioration (and a
subsequent improvement), in the trade
account ofthe country with a depreciating cur-
rency, and to an improvement in the trade bal-
vt 1vl~ance of the country with an appreciating cur-
\,\IJ,) v rency. The initial deterioration and subsequent
improvement in the depreciating country's
trade account resemble the letter J when the
trade account is plotted on the vertical axis
against time on the horizontal axis.
Some critics also have argued that the pric-
ing behavior ofexporters has changed with the
adoption of flexible exchange rates, with
exporters changing their profit margins rather
,than their prices in order to maintain sales.
Hence, a depreciation simply tends to increase
the home-currency price of exports and to
lower the foreign-currency price of imports,
leaving the devaluing country's competitive
position unchanged.
The contentious debate about the ability ofa
freely floating exchange rate to restore price
competitiveness has surfaced most recently in
the controversy over the Japanese-U.S. auto-
mobile trade. That particular conflict has been
resolved temporarily through the imposition
of "yoluntary" quotas on Japanese cars. But
Japan has been running a persistently high
s1.ltplus not only with the U.S. butalso with the
European community, and this has brought
forth protectionist pressures against Japanese
products.
This paper is designed to investigate the
effectiveness ofexchange-rate changes on the
Japanese trade account. The view that
exchange-rate movements will be completely
passed forward into export and import prices
can no longer be taken for granted. Thus the
first stage ofour analysis considers the impact
of an exchange-rate change on the prices of
exports and imports, and the second stage con-
siders the effects ofthese price changes on the
quantities demanded of exports and imports. 1
This two-stage procedure allows us to trace out
the J-curve measuring the effects ofa yen de-
preciation on the Japanese trade account.
Sections I and II provide the theoretical and
empirical framework for measuring the effects
of exchange-rate changes on export and
import prices. Section III discusses the respon-
siveness of trade volumes to changes in rela-
tive prices, and Section IV describes the
derivation ofthe J-curve. The paper concludes
with a discussion of the policy implications.
I. Determination of Export and Import Prices
In the traditional view of trade adjustment, Japanese market. (In this example, the
an exchange-rate depreciation will lead to a average price ofan American good rises from
proportional decline in the foreign-currency 100 yen to 110 yen.) The rise in price makes
price of exports and a proportional rise in the American goods less attractive to Japanese
domestic-currency price ofimports. The effec- buyers. Assume a demand elasticity of -1.6.
tiveness of a devaluation thus will depend The 10-percent price increase prompts a 16-
upon whether or not the absolute value ofthe percent fall in the quantity demanded of U.S.
sum of the price elasticities of demand is goods by Japanese importers. This is illustr-
greater than one. ated diagrammatically by a shift in the supply
To illustrate, consider the impact of a yen schedule from ss to Sf Sf. The quantity
depreciation on the Japanese trade account demanded ofU.S. goods falls from 200 million
(Chart 0. Suppose a yen depreciation of 10 to 168 million units. The lower volume of
percent vis-a-vis the dollar leads to a propor- American goods demanded more than offsets
tional rise in the yen price ofU.S. goods in the the price increase, so that the value of
56Japanese imports in yen falls in response to a
yen depreciation. In this example, the yen
value of Japanese imports (price x quantity)
declines from 20 billion yen to 18.48 billion
yen. With the dollar price unchanged, the
valueofJapanese imports in dollars falls by the
percentage change in the quantity demanded
(16 percent) .
Conversely, on the exportside, a 10-percent
yen depreciation produces a fall in the dollar
price ofJapanese exports, improving the price
competitiveness ofJapanese goods in the U.S.
market. The greater demand stemming from
the price decline is illustrated by a rightward
shift in the demand schedule from DD to
D'D'. Again, assume a demand elasticity of
-1.6. The fall in the dollar price of Japanese
exports boosts the quantity demanded by
Americans of Japanese goods by 16 percent.
With the yen price unchanged, the yen value
of Japanese exports rises in direct proportion
to the percentage increase in the quantity
demanded. In dollars, the higher volume of
Japanese exports more than compensates for
the price decline, so that the dollar value of
Japanese exports rises following a yen de-
preciation.
Chart 1
Impact of 10-Percent Yen Depreciation
on the JapaneseTrade Account
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57On balance, the value of Japanese exports
rises in both yen and dollars following a yen
depreciation, while import value falls in both
currencies. This is, however, predicated on the
assumptions that the demand elasticities are
greater than unity, and that import and export
prices both adjust to the full extent of
exchange depreciation.
In the short run, export and import quan-
tities tend to be unresponsive to price changes.
That is, buyers and sellers need time to recog-
nize changes in competitive positions and act
accordingly. In fact, an exchange-rate change
initially is likely to lead to a deterioration in the
trade account of the country with a depreciat-
ing currency.
We may assume, as above, that the long-run
price elasticities of demand are -1.6 for both
exports and imports - and that their
responses are uniform over time, so that
export and import volume each decline 0.2
percent per quarter for eight quarters following
a yen depreciation. In this case, the Marshall-
Lerner condition is met only in the third
quarter following the exchange-rate change.
This movement in the trade account is de-
picted graphically in Chart 2, illustrating the
so-called J-curve phenomenon.
Separately, various observers have argued
that exchange-rate changes are totally ineffec-
tive in eliminating trade imbalances, because
exporters will absorb those changes into higher
or lower profit margins so as to maintain sales.
For example, a yen depreciation (apprecia-
tion) will prompt Japanese exporters to raise
(lower) their yen prices by the same percen-
tage amount. This implies that Japanese
exporters set their prices on the basis of
foreign-competitor prices measured in yen,
and not on the basis of domestic cost con-
siderations.
Export prices in yen would rise by the full
amount of the depreciation only when supply
is fixed or the demand schedule is perfectly
horizontaL The former condition may be rele-
vant for a country which is operating at full
capacity and has a large export sector relative
to total output. In the one case, the full utiliza-
tion of resources would not permit export
firms to increase supply. In the second case,
their ability to increase supply would depend
upon bidding away resources from the non-
tradeable goods sector, and this capacity would
be limited if the export sector is large relative
Chart 2





58to the total economy.
Japanese firms meanwhile would face a
horizontal demand schedule only if their pro-
ductcannot be differentiated from foreign pro-
ducts and their supply represents a small part
of total world production. In the case of
undifferentiated products - such as silver, tin
and copper, but not motor vehicles - buyers
are indifferent to the country from which they
purchase. Thus, the law ofone price holds and
no one exporter can sell at a different price. At
the same time, ifthe quantity supplied by the
firm or country is small relative to total world
supply, then its own output will have little
effect on price. Under these two conditions,
the export price is given exogenously and the
quantity of exports is determined in the long-
run via a supply curve.
In the Japanese case, its exports represent a
small proportion of total domestic production
but loom large relative to European and Amer-
ican exports of manufactured goods. Conse-
quently, the supply ofJapanese exports should
be highly sensitive to prices and should
strongly influence international prices in turn.
Moreover, Japanese producers should have a
certain amount of control over price, because
their exports are composed largely offinished
goods with a high degree of product differen-
tiation. With this information, one would
expect Japanese export prices to be jointly
determined by cost conditions and foreign
competitor prices.
In contrast, Japanese imports are heavily
weighted with basic commodities (primary raw
materials) which are noted for a high degree of
homogeneity. As a consequence, Japan should
largely be a price taker on the import side; that
is, a yen depreciation should lead to a propor-
tional rise in Japanese import prices in yen.
This proposition will be tested below.
II. Specification of Export and Import Price Equations
The rise in export prices in response to an
exchange-rate change may be tested
empirically. Here we specify a chain of causa-
tion running from exchange rates to prices to
exportquantities. 2For clarity ofexposition, we
assume that export quantities do not adjust to
prices immediately, 3 since the literature indi-
cates that long lags are involved.
In measuring the pass-through effect, we
consider four export commodity groupings:
machinery and equipment, metal products,
chemicals, and textiles. Recent empirical
research (e.g., Spitaller, 1980) has attributed
no significance to domestic-cost variables in
the setting of export prices. The result may
simply reflect aggregation bias, and not the
determination of domestic prices by interna-
tional prices. Separate equations thus may be
estimated for each price series, which in turn
permits us to determine the responsiveness
(and time lag) of export prices to exchange-
rate changes.
Within individual product categories, the
extent of the pass-through depends upon the
nature of the product and the cost charac-
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teristics of the industry. As a proxy for
domestic costs, researchers have generally
relied upon unit labor costs. However, this
measure fails to account for the dramatic
recent rise in raw material prices, which sug-
gests the need to utilize a more comprehensive
measure, such as the wholesale-price index.
Another consideration is the tendency for a
higher level ofcapacity utilization to limit the
supply response ofexporters, causing them to
allocate output by raising prices instead. 4
We hypothesize, then, that Japanese expor-
ters set prices on the basis of 1) the yen
exchange rate, 2) the prices of foreign com-
petitor goods expressed in local currency, 3)
the level of capacity utilization, and 4) labor
and other input costs (proxied by wholesale
prices). The general form of the specification
can be written as:
XP = f(WP, EX, CP, CU)
where XP = export prices,
WP = wholesale prices,
CP = foreign competitive prices,
CU = capacity utilization,
EX = exchange rate.In contrast, Japanese imports (as noted) are
heavily weighted with basic commodities with
a high degree of homogeneity. The "law of
one price" thus should hold, so that a de-
preciation ofthe dollar leads to a proportional
fall in imported commodity prices in yen
terms. For example, the 36-percent deprecia-
tion of the dollar against the yen between the
first quarter of 1976 and the fourth quarter of
1978 paralleled a 32-percent decline in the yen
price of oil over that period. The prices of
Japanese imports in yen terms will be related
to the yen/$ exchange rate and to the world
commodity-price index denominated in dol-
lars5• A coefficient value ofone attached to the
yen/$ exchange rate would be consistent with
complete pass-through. This proposition will
be tested with respect to food, fuels, raw
materials, and metals - categories accounting
for 75 percent of all imports.
The next step after estimating price equa-
tions is to determine the effects ofchanges in
the terms of trade (export prices over import
prices) on the quantities of exports and
imports. That is, having established the extent
and duration of the price response to an
exchange-rate change, we must next relate
export and import quantities to their respec-
tive prices. By substituting the price equations
into the respective volume equations, the esti-
mated time path between an exchange-rate de-
preciation and its impact on export and import
quantities can thereby be derived.
III. Determination of Export and Import Quantities
The theory ofconsumer demand provides a
basis for analyzing the demand for exports and
imports. As for imports, the quantity ofa good
that a consumer wants to purchase depends
upon his income and the price of competing
substitutes. A higher level ofincome increases
the consumer's ability to purchase more
goods. The allocation of his income among
foreign and domestic goods depends upon
their prices and their degree ofsubstitutability.
At the national level, a rise in real income
translates into increased demand for domestic
and foreign goods. The allocation of income
among domestic and foreign goods depends
upon the prices of foreign goods relative to
import-competing substitutes. The demand for
imports can therefore be written as a function
of domestic real income6 and the prices of
imported goods relative to domestic goods.
The general model is:
MV= fey, PMIWP)
where MV = import volume,
Y = Japanese industrial production
PM = import prices,
WP = wholesale prices.
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The same reasoning applies to exports. A
higher level ofincome abroad will increase the
demand for a country's exports. An increase in
the price ofthe export good relative to foreign
competitors' goods will diminish the demand
for it. Moreover, an increase in demand for a
good may not bring forth a supply response
due to production bottlenecks. An exporter
faced with supply constraints thus may decide
to allocate his output by slowing delivery times
instead of raising prices. The waiting time
imposes a cost on the buyer which is not incor-
porated into the price of the product. In the
general form, we can write the export-volume
equation7as follows:
XV = fey, PXIWPX, CU)
where XV = export volume,
Y = real GNP abroad,
PX = price of exports,
WPX = foreign competitor prices (in
yen),
CU = capacity utilization in Japan.IV. Empirical Results
Lag Quarter 90
On the basis ofboth volume and price equa-
tions, a depreciation ofthe yen will worsen the
trade balance during the first half year (see
Chart 3). Between the second and third quar-
ters, the trade balance will show an improve-
ment in both domestic and foreign currency
units, and the maximum improvement will
occur during the fifth quarter following the de-
preciation. At the maximum point, the value
ofJapanese exports and imports in yen9would
have risen by 15.9 percent and 6.5 percent,
respectively. The time lag between an
exchange-rate change and a trade-account
improvement would be considerably less than











Using the parameter estimates obtained
from the model, we performed several experi-
ments to measure the impact ofexchange-rate
movements on Japan's trade account in 1980
and 1981. In this connection, we cannot ignore
the effects ofoil-price hikes on Japan's recent
trade performance. From the fourth quarter of
1978 through the fourth quarter of 1979,
Japan's trade balance shifted from a surplus of
¥-842 billion to a deficit of¥-916 billion. The
marked deterioration largely reflected the con-
current run-up in oil prices from $12.80 to
$24.28 a barrel, which was then followed by a
further rise to $33.81 a barrel in the fourth
quarter of 1980. Moreover, economic growth
during 1980 increased at a 3.6-percent rate in
Our results (Table 1) indicate that only
about 38 percent ofan exchange-rate change is
passed forward into export prices expressed in
foreign currency. 8 That is, Japanese exporters
respond to a 10-percent depreciation
(appreciation) ofthe yen by raising (lowering)
their yen prices by about 6 percent. They res-
pond slightly more to changes in foreign com-
petitor prices expressed in foreign currency,
matching on average about 66 percent ofcom-
petitors' price increases.
Contrary to some earlier empirical evidence,
domestic cost variables have played a role in
setting Japanese export prices, for three ofthe
four commodity categories. These variables
proved insignificant only in the case of ma-
chinery and equipment, which suggests that
further disaggregation was necessary. Overall,
export prices of Japanese manufacturers were
jointly determined by domestic cost considera-
tions and foreign competitor prices.
Estimated price equations for different
import categories tend to confirm that Japan is
a price taker on the import side (see Table 2).
That is, an exchange-rate appreciation (de-
preciation) will lead to a proportional fall (rise)
in the domestic currency price of Japanese
imports. This result, combined with the esti-
mated pass-through on the export side, sug-
gests that a IO-percent yen depreciation will
lead to about a 3.8-percentage-point deteriora-
tion in the terms of trade. With no change in
export and import quantities, this terms-of-
trade effect will lead to an initial deterioration
in the trade account. The duration ofthe wor-
sening trade balance - the duration ofthe first
segment of the J-curve - will depend upon
the time lag between movements in quantities
and prices, and upon the size ofthe export and
import elasticities.
The long-run price elasticities of demand
were estimated at -0.35 for imports and at -2.5
for exports (Table 3). The price responsive-
ness ofJapanese imports extended over a four-
quarter period, whereas on the export side, the
price effect was fully absorbed within five
quarters.
61Table 1
Effects of Movements in the Exchange Rate,
Foreign Competitive Prices, and Wholesale Prices on
Export Unit Values of Japanese Manufactured Goods


































*Signifies coefficient is significantly different from zero at an alpha level of0.10;** for alpha level of0.05;*** for alpha level
of0.01.
I. Tests ofsignificance in the machinery-and-equipment equation should be viewed warily, because of first-order autocor-
relation in the residuals.
2. The elasticity ofexport prices with respect to the exchange rate, foreign competitive prices and wholesale prices was cal-
culated as a weighted average ofthe elasticities for each commodity category, with weights proportional to the share ofeach
commodity in total manufacturing exports. The weights are 0.698 for machinery and equipment, 0.184 for metal products,
0.058 for chemicals and 0.054 for textiles. These calculated elasticities are shown without parentheses.
3. The elasticity ofexport prices with respect to foreign competitive prices, measured in domestic currency units, was calcu-
lated as a weighted average of the elasticities of export prices with respect to the exchange rate and foreign competitive
prices, denominated in foreign currency units. The weights were proportional to the standard errors of the coefficients.
4. The tests for significance refer to F-tests for the joint influence ofthe exchange rate and foreign competitive prices. The
null and alternative hypotheses were:
Ho: BI = B2 = 0
HA: BI = B2 = 0
where & = 0.05. this was the case for machinery and equipment, metal products and textiles.
5. In 1980, manufacturing exports constituted 90 percent of all exports.
Table 2
Effects of Movements in the Dollar/Yen Rate
on the Prices of Imported Commodities3

























*Denotes significance to 0.05 level. However, because offirst-order autocorrelations in the residuals, tests ofsignificance
should be viewed warily due to biased standard errors of coefficients.
1. The coefficient attached to the exchange rate for each commodity category was insignificantly different from one.
2. The metals equation was corrected for first-order correlation.
3. The four commodity categories constituted over 75 percent ofall imports.
Table 3
























-0.35Japan while stagnating in the U.S. and major
European countries. The growth differential in
Japan's favor should have stimulated faster
growth in Japanese imports relative to exports.
When combined with the oil-price rise, a sub-
stantial widening of the trade deficit thus
should have beenrealized in 1980. On the con-
trary, the Japanese trade account showed a ¥-
216-billion surplus in the fourth quarter of
1980, a turnaround of¥-1132 billion over the
year. The explanation for this paradoxical
turnaround may be found in a review of our
regression equations.
We noted earlier that a yen depreciation will
tend to raise the yen prices ofJapanese exports
andimports, while a yen appreciation will have
the opposite effect. The yen's trade-weighted
exchange rate (the effective exchange rate)
depreciated by 29 percent during 1979, but
then appreciated by 14 percent during 1980
(fourth quarter to fourth quarter). Largely
reflecting these movements, Japanese expor-
ters raised their yen prices by 22 percent dur-
ing 1979 but by little more than zero in 1980.
With an estimated offset coefficient of 0.62,
exchange-rate movements contributed 18 per-
centage points to the 1979 price rise (0.62
times effective yen depreciation of29 percent)
but reduced the 1980 price rise by almost 9
percentage points (0.62 times effective yen
appreciation of 14 percent). The marked
deceleration in export prices during 1980 thus
was consistent with the evidence presented in
the text.
On the import side, the 1979 yen deprecia-
tion should have inflated the yen prices of
imports while the subsequent appreciation of
1980 should have had the opposite effect.
Reflecting the oil-price hikes, Japanese import
prices in yen actually rose by 70 percent during
1979 and by 81 12 percent during 1980. Accord-
ing to the regression model, exchange-rate
movements contributed almost 26 percentage
points to import prices in 1979 while lowering
import prices by almost 12 percentage points
in 1980. As before, recent data thus bear out
the empirical evidence in the text.
Overall, movements in the terms of trade
attributable to exchange-rate changes made a
63
relatively modest contribution to the trade
account. The reverse J-curve effects stemming
from the 1980 yen appreciation contributed
about ¥-350 billion to that year's trade surplus.
The improvement in trade volumes was more
important to this turnaround. Movements in
exchange rates, particularly the 33.6-percent
effective yen depreciation between the third
quarter of 1978 and the first quarter of 1980,
can more than account for the 16.3-percent
growth in export volume and 6.8-percent drop
in import volume. On balance, the outside
sample estimates indicate that movements in
effective exchange rates made a positive con-
tribution to the Japanese trade account of
¥-3100 billion between 1979IV and 1980IV -
more than offsetting the oil-price rise and the
activity effect (higher economic growth in
Japan than abroad).
In 1981, the effective exchange rate of the
yen remained fairly stable. However, much to
the consternation of Japan's trading partners,
the trade surplus continued to expand - to a
¥400-billion quarterly surplus in the first three
quarters of 1981, compared with a ¥-900 bil-
lion deficit in the corresponding 1980 period.
For one reason, the terms of trade have
improved due to a fall in import prices, reflect-
ing weakness in world commodity prices. On
the other hand, export volume has increased
while import volume has fallen. In the first
nine months ofl981, export volume rose 12.8
percent above the corresponding 1980 figure.
While less robust than the 1980 gains, these
export increases are nonetheless substantial,
reflecting as they do the relative price changes
of the preceding year. From the model's out-
side-sample estimates, about two-thirds ofthe
1981 export-volume increase can be attributed
to movements in the yen's effective exchange
rate, which in 1980 produced a 6A-percent
improvement in Japan's price competitiveness
as measured by relative export prices of
manufactures. In fact, the 29-percent rise in
Japanese export volume since 1979 can,
according to the model's results, be attributed
to exchange-rate movements. (The est,imated
contribution was 31 percent.) In particular,
movements in the yen's exchange rate morethan accounted for the 13.5-percent fall be-
tween·1978 and 1980 in the relative prices of
Japanese manufactured-goods exports.
Moreover, foreign activity contributed little if
any impetus to export volume growth, reflect-
ing the virtual stagnation in U.S. and European
economic activity in the 1980-81 period.
On the import side, exchange-rate move-
ments would have predicted a 1.0 percent fall
in import volume over the last two years. This
compares with an 8.8-percent actual decline in
the first three quarters of 1981 compared to
the corresponding period of1979. Energy con-
servation, .stemming from the oil-price rise,
apparentlymade the major contribution to fall-
ingimport quantities over this period.
V. Policy Implications
The size of the Japanese trade surplus with
the U.S. and the European Economic Com-
munity (E.E.C,) has seriously impaired trade
relations among the three major trading
partners. The E.E.C. trade deficit with Japan is
estimated at roughly $10 billion for 1981, and
the U.S. bilateral trade deficit is expected to
approach $15 billion. E.E.C. policymakers thus
are calling on Japan to take appropriate
measures to redress the imbalance - just as
U.S. policymakers did when pressing for
Japanese curbs on auto exports. Without
voluntary restraint, the Brussels Commission
has said that it would consider curbing
Japanese access to E.E.C. markets for motor
vehicles, TV sets and machine tools over the
next five years.
The Japanese Government has announced
certain short-term measures to reduce the
trade deficit, such as increasing Government
stockpiles of crude oil and possibly increasing
imports ofnickel, cobalt, and other metals. But
these moves are unlikely to placate Americans
and Europeans, since their deficits vis-a-vis
Japan are mainly concentrated in manufac-
tured-goods trade.
The empirical estimates in the text suggest
that Japan's expanding surplus vis-a-vis the
U.S. and Europe could have been expected in
light ofrecent exchange-rate movements. The
yen depreciated by 33.6 percent against the
U.S. dollar and major European currencies be-
tween 1978III and 19801, apparently prompted
by the concurrent run-up in oil prices. With oil
representing 40 percent of Japanese imports,
the sharp rise in oil prices greatly enlarged
Japan's import bill, requiring additional
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financing to erase the shortfall through higher
export growth. As a result, the yen exchange
rate depreciated, improving the price com-
petitiveness of Japanese goods and thereby
creating the foreign demand for a higher level
of Japanese exports. The increased exports
found their way into the U.S. and E.E.C.
markets, raising Japan's market share during a
period ofwidespread recession and unemploy-
ment.
The empirical results show that Japanese
exporters offset about 62 percent ofa yen de-
preciation (appreciation) by raising (lowering)
their yen prices. Despite less than 40-percent
pass-through into export prices, the yen's
effective exchange rate declined substantially,
producing a 13.6-percent decline in the rela-
tive prices of Japanese manufactured-goods
exports between 1978 and 1980. With an esti-
mated price elasticity of demand of -2.52, the
fall in the yen rate and the related improve-
ment in price competitiveness can more than
account for a 29-percent growth in Japanese
export volume between 1979 and 1981 (first
three quarters). Further contributing to the
improvement in the Japanese trade account
was a fall-off in import volume. But because of
the small price elasticity of demand of -0.35,
the. resulting reduction in import quantities
was modest by comparison. Overall, the
empirical results indicate that movements in
the yen's effective exchange rate contributed
substantially to Japan's trade performance in
the 1980-81 period.
According to the empirical findings, the
growing controversy between Japan and its
major trading partners does not stem from theineffectiveness of exchange-rate changes to
produce adjustments in the trade account. On
the contrary, the yen depreciation fonowing
the oil-price hikes may have gone too far.
Japan's 1981 trade surplus more than offset its
traditional deficit on services and transfers,
placing the current account in surplus.
The signs are particularly ominous for the
U.S. While the effective exchange rate
remained fairly stable during most of1981, the
yen depreciated by 9 percent against the dollar
over the first three quarters ofthe year - and
by 22 percent since 1978IV. Japan's price com-
petitiveness vis-a-vis the U.S. also increased
because ofhigher U.S. inflation, as U.S. export
prices in 1981 roseanestimated3.4 percentage
points more than Japanese export prices
measured in local currency. Given the U.S.
inflation and given the donar's appreciation
against the yen, the U.S. thus has suffered a
marked erosion ofits competitive position vis-
a-vis Japan. This portends an expanding
bilateral trade deficit in 1982. This situation,
coupled with rising U.S. unemployment,
almost insures continued tensions in the trade
relations of these two countries in the
foreseeable future.
Appendix A
Data Series and Sources
The data come from numerous sources,
including various issues ofthe Bank ofJapan's
Economic Statistics Monthly, the Monthly
Statistics of Japan published by the Statistics
Bureau, The National Institute of Economic
and Social Research Review, IMF Interna-
tional Financial Statistics and the UN Bulletin
of Statistics. Estimation period extends from
Ql, 1974 to Q4, 1979.
1) Exchange Rate - The exchange-rate
variable was defined in yen per foreign cur-
rency units, and included the currencies ofthe
U.S., Germany, Britain, France and Italy. In
cQnstructing the index, we weighted each
exchange rate by that country's share in total
manufactured-goods exports. 10 In the index,
1975 = 100.
2) Foreign Competitor Prices - Unit-value
indices of manufactured-goods exports were
used as a proxy for foreign competitor prices in
each of the four product categories. An index
was calculated with 1975 as the base period.
The countries involved and the weights are
identical to those employed for the exchange-
rate index.
3) World Export Prices for Basic Com-
modities - We used a weighted average of
commodity-price indices, expressed in dollars,
taken from various UN publications. The base
period was 1975, and weights were calculated
on the basis of shares in Japanese imports for
each product category.
4) Foreign Real Income - We used a
weighted average of real GNP for the same
countries used in calculating the exchange-rate
and foreign-competitor price indices. The base
period was 1975, and the weights present
world-trade shares.
Appendix B: Export Price Equations
Machinery andEquipment






Ln(PX) = -2.03 + 1.06 Ln(WP) + (4.22)Ln(EX)
(4.8) (4.10







Ln(PX) = -2.34 + 1.57 (WP) ,+ 0.58 Ln(EX),
(-3.66) (4.11) (1.74)







Ln(PX) = -0.05 + 1.05 Ln(WP),+ 1.11 Ln(EX) ,
(-2.19) 0.34) (2.58)





where t-statistics are in brackets below the
estimated parameters.
Variable Names:
PX = export prices (machinery and equip-
ment, textiles, chemicals, metals, and
manufactured goods).
EX = trade-weighted exchange rate (yen per
foreign currency unit)
CP = trade-weighted competitor prices
CU = capacity utilization (textiles and chemi-
cals)
WP = wholesale prices (textiles, chemicals,
and metals).
Notes on Export Price Equations
Machinery and Equipment
1) Wholesale prices and capacity utilization
for machinery and equipment proved to be
insignificant and were dropped from the equa-
tion. Thus, pricing decisions ofmachinery and
equipment manufacturers were almost entirely
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influenced by external factors rather than
domestic cost considerations. However, these
results may be tentative, since further disag-
gregation may be required to pick up the
effects of domestic costs on export prices.
2) Across export product categories, only
the machinery and equipment equation
exhibited first-order autocorrelation. This
result is consistent with the actual behavior of
the export-price series of machinery and
equipment, which was also identified as a first-
order autoregressive process.
Textiles
1) The equations for textiles, metal pro-
ducts, and chemicals were estimated in first-
difference form, although either levels or first
differences would be theoretically sound.
2) Ofall the variables, only foreign competi-
tor prices proved to be insignificant. But this
may simply reflect the downward bias associ-ated with errors in variables stemming from
the much broader coverage ofthe competitor-
price series.
3) A one-percent depreciation of the yen
will lead to a 1.22-percentincrease in domestic
currency prices of Japanese exports. This
implies more than complete passthrough.
However, the coefficient on the exchange-rate
term is not significantly different from one. As
a consequence, it would be better to say that
Japanese exporters raise (lower) their prices
by the same percentage amount as the
exchange rate.
Chemicals
1) The coefficient values on Ln(EX) and
Ln(CP) and their respective t-statistics are the
same, reflecting the merging of Ln(EX) and
Ln(CP) into a single variable, referred to as
foreign-competitor prices expressed in yen.
This composite variable was used because of
the strong correlation among the independent
variables in the estimating equation, yielding
inconclusive results. The hypothesis of
equality between the coefficients on the
exchange-rate variable (EX) and the foreign-
competitor price term (CP) could not be
rejected at the 0.5 level ofsignificance. For the
purposes of measuring pass-through, a coeffi-
cient value of 0.58 is used for the exchange
rate. With this result, only 42 percent of an
exchange-rate change is passed forward into
foreign currency prices of Japanese chemical
exports.
Metals
The specification for metal products is simi-
lar to the equations for chemicals and textiles,
but with several modifications. In particular,
the capacity utilization rate was dropped
because of its insignificance. As a result, the
change in metal-product export prices is a
function ofchanges in metal wholesale prices,
the exchange-rate index, and foreign-competi-
tor prices denominated in foreign currency.
Moreover, disequilibrium effects were incor-
porated into the specification, as exemplified
by lagged ratios of export prices to foreign
competitors' prices and to wholesale prices.
Estimation of the model with either one or
both ofthe ratio variables yielded a significant
value only for the variable with wholesale
prices in the denominator. The model has the
long-run property that export prices are deter-
mined by domestic cost considerations (See
Davidson, 1978).
Manufactured Goods
We estimated a separate equation relating
the prices of all manufactured goods to the
exchange rate (EX) and foreign competitor
prices measured in foreign currency (CP). The
specification was the same as for the ma-
chinery-and-equipment equation. The results
are not reported here because ofthe equation's
low explanatory power (R2=0.16) and the
insignificance ofthe exchange-rate term (EX).
Moreoever, wholesale prices and capacity
utilization proved to be insignificant when
added to the model. These results justify the
disaggregated approach adopted here. In fact,
the insignificance of domestic cost variables
and the autocorrelation in the residuals sug-
gest that further disaggregation should have
been undertaken for machinery and equip-
ment.
Appendix C: Export and Import Volume Equations
Variable Names:
XV = export volume
DI, D2, D3 = seasonal dummies
WGNP = world GNP
CD = capacity utilization
PX = price of exports
CP = competitor prices
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EX = exchange rate
MV = import volume
IP = Japanese industrial production
PM = import prices
WPI = Japanese wholesale pricesExport Volume Equation
LN(xv)(= 27.5 - 0.19 Dl - 0.17 D2 -0.39 D3 + 1.85 LN (WGNP)(-8.66 LN (CU)
(1.79)(-1.52) (-1.20 (-1.83)
-2.52 LN (C:~X) (.k+ et
(-2.29)
Coefficient on









IV;"" 0.67,Se= 0.148,D.W. = 1.74
Q(l8) = 11.4, n = 19
(2.08) (2.43)
Import Volume Equation J
LN(MV) (= 1.80 + O.OlDl + 0.01 D2+20.03 D3+ 0.61LNOP)(- 0.35 LN (~~I)(.k + e(
(3.80 (1.00) (0.70 (3.13) (6.00 (-3.74)
Notes on Trade Equation
The price elasticities of demand for exports
and imports were estimated by the Almon lag
technique, to offset the limited sample size
and strong correlation between lagged inde-
pendent variables. The relative price terms
Ln(PX/CP EX) and Ln(PM/WPI) were
entered as second-degree polynomials con-
strained at the far endpoint. The number of
lags were determined sequentially by the addi-
Coefficient on

















tion oflagged terms until they turned insignifi-
cant.
The long-run price elasticities of demand
were. estimated at -2.52 for exports and -0.35
for imports, both of which appear reasonable.
Almost all Japanese exports are manufactured
goods, while imports are mainly basic com-
modities. Low price elasticities are generally
associated with goods with few available
substitutes. In natural-resource starved Japan,
a rise in prices of imported commodities will
bring little reduction in demand due to the
unavailability ofdomestic substitutes. By com-
parison, manufactured goods should have a
l11\,lchlarger price elasticity. For example, a
higher price for Sony stereos should lead U.S.
consumers to buy domestic substitutes or
comparable European models instead.
The contemporaneous price effect on export
and import volumes apparently has a perverse
sign. But this result could be expected, since
others have also found a positive price
elasticity in the short run (see, for example,
68Wilson and Takacs). This reflects the factthat
trade volumes depend not only upon actual
prices but also onexp~cted prices. For exam-
pIe, a Japanese petroleum importer who
expected oil prices to rise would accelerate his
purchases to avoid later. price increases... The
central question concernS how expectations
are formed. If, for. example, buyers expected
price one quarter ahead is equal to the current
price (PJ plus a positive fraction ofthe price
change from the preceding quarter (Pt. Pt),
then a direct relationship·between prices·and
trade volumes should be observed contem-
poraneously. A rise in price will generate
expectations of higher prices in the future,
leading buyers to speed up their purchases
from supplying countries.
Thereal·ineome variable in the export-
volume equation is a weighted average of real
GNP for the countries used in constructing the
indices of foreign competitor prices and
exchange rates. Several·weighting··schemes
were tried, inchlding shares of a country's
imports from Japan as a. proportion of total
Japanese exports, shares ofa country's
importsofmanufactured goods as a proportion
ofworldmanufacturing trade, and.shares ofa
cQuntry's net exports of manufactured goods
in relation to the total trade in manufactures.
All weighting schemes were normalized to
sunl to one. These real-income. series proved
to be highly correlated with lagged values of
the relative price term, yielding insignificant
values for both variables. The only weighting
schemes that did not produce high correlation
between the activity and relative-price effects
were the export-share weights used in the
exchange-rate and foreign-competitor price
series; Our· export·volume·equation·estimates
incorporate the real GNP variable with these
export-share weights.
FOOTNOTES
1. The induced price and income effects resulting
from exchange-rate changes will largely be ignored
here. For example, a yen depreciation, by increasing
the price competitiveness of Japanese export and
import-competing industries, will produce a shift in
demand towards Japanese products. The higher level
of production will generate increased demands for
imported goods. At the same time, the exchange-rate
depreciation will raise the cost of imported goods
which serve as intermediate goods in the production
of exports. This, in turn, will put upward pressure on
export prices, partially offsetting the effects of
exchange-rate changes. Moreover, imported goods
are part of the consumption bundle whose price forms
the basis for union wage demands. Higher import
prices stemming from currency depreciation will
require higher nominal wage settlements to maintain
the same pattern of real wage gains. The increase in
labor costs would produce a deterioration in price
competitiveness. Since these secondary effects wiil
tend to offset (partly or fully) the impact of an
exchange-rate depreciation on the trade account, the
estimates presented here represent upper-bound
estimates of its effectiveness in reducing trade im-
balances.
2. Thecause-and-effect relationship, as specified in
the basic model, runs from wholesale prices,
exchange rate and foreign competitor prices to export
prices. This chain of causation is necessary for
estimating the price equations, even though (accord-
ing to purchasing-power parity) the predicated
cause-and-effect relationship runs from prices to the
exchange rate in a period of freely fluctuating rates.
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3. The time interval before export quantities start
adjusting can be subdivided, according to Magee, into
currency contract and pass-through periods. The dis-
cussion so far has emphasized the latter. The former
stems from statistical deficiencies inherent in using
unit-value indices. That is, unit-value indices refer to
prices at the time of delivery and not at the time of
contract negotiation. Because of time lags between
orders and deliveries, the pricing behavior of export-
ers and importers immediately following a devaluation
may not be contemporaneously incorporated into the
in<:tex. However, this does not necessarily mean that
unit-value indices will fail to reflect contemporaneous
movements in exchange rates. For example, suppose
that 50 percent of Japanese exports are invoiced in
do.llars; a ten-percent appreciation of the yen vis-a-
vis the dollar then will translate, everything else held
constant, into a five-percent decline in Japanese
export prices. Moreover, suppose that Japan sells 30
percentonts exports to Germany and that 50 percent
of these contracts are invoiced in marks; then, a ten-
percent appreciation of yen relative to the OM will
lower export prices by 1.5 percent. The higher the
proportion of contracts invoiced in foreign currency,
the greater will be the effect of an exchange-rate
change on the unit-value index measured in domestic
currency.
4. Any general effects of capacity utilization on the
price •level should already be incorporated in the
Wholesale-price index. The use.of capacity utilization
in conjunction with wholesale· prices simply
measures Whether export prices respond differently
to the former than to the latter.5.thecomposilion of Japanese imports within each
commodity category will differ from the product mix in
the International price index for that commodity.
Otherwise,the relationship would be an identity and
no coefficient estimates would be obtainable.
6. Since basic commodities account for most
Japanese Iroports, indlJstrial production would be a
mOre appropriate argument for import demand than
real GNP.A higher level of industrial output will
require .larger Inputs of raw materials, leading to
increased demand for imported commodities.
7. In 1980, manufactured goods accounted for 90
percent of Japanese exports. As a reasonable
approximation, the estimated coefficient measuring
the effect$>of exchange-rate changes on manufac-
tured-goods prices will be used to measure the pass-
through of an exchange-rate change on aggregate
export prices.
8. The estimated pass-through of an exchange-rate
change into export prices was obtained by weighting
each one of the pass-through coefficients for
differel1!cofTlroogi!y .. grolJpings by their respective
share in Japanese exports.
9. Exports-import movements are virtually the same
in fweign.currency as in yen. The trade balance in
forEligncurrency Improves following an exchange-
rat~changebetweenthe second and third quarters.
The <maximum improvement occurs during the fifth
quarter, where the rise In export value in foreign cur-
rency would be 5.8 percent, compared with a 3.2-per-
cent decline in imPort value.
to. The Index is weighted by world export shares
instead of bilateral trade values. This reflects the
geographicaldistribution of Japanese trade. That is,
a~()lJt50percent of Japan's exports.go to the Far
East lind QPEC, as compared with a 4-percent share
taken by Germany. However, Japan faces considera-
blYrnOrecompetition from Germany in third markets
than dO other suppliers. As a consequence, the use of
bilateral-trade weights may seriously understate the
importance of exchange-rate movements between
two cOlJntries that specialize in the same goods but
do little trade with each other, such as Germany and
Japan. World-trade weights thus seem most appropri-
ate for Japan.
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